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ACIS - 1032/86
13 January 1986

NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI

FROM: C/ACIS

This note is for your action.

You sent the attached material back to me to "hold for possible later use". I will do that, but it seems to me that there may have been a slight misunderstanding. This correspondence is for you to send a response back to ACDA Director Adelman--who had sent you a memorandum; this is not a letter to the President. This point arises because your memorandum to me (copy included, beneath this note) addresses a letter to the President.

If I am the one who is confused, fine; just have Debbie call me, and I will pick this package up and literally do as you ask.

If I could do more, please call.



L-225-IR

25X1

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS/DI		X		
18	D/SOVA		X		
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	ES		X		
21	ER				
22					

SUSPENSE _____

Date _____

Remarks

Executive Secretary
9 Jan 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Executive Registry
86- 0078

9 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, DI

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with D/ACDA Ken Adelman, 9 January 1986

1. I had a good talk with Ken today. We agreed that we would not write the joint letter on [] budget matters. He wants to do another joint letter with me raising the verification issue early in the process this time and suggested bringing the resource issues to the President's attention in that letter.

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2. I told him we were setting up a new group to study [] He asked if Fred Eimer could be included in that group, if only to educate him. I hedged on the response.

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3. Ken agrees on the inadequacy of the proposed DoD response with respect to violations. His prescription is that after citing violations for five years we lose credibility and damage the arms control process if we say anything other than as long as the Soviets continue in violation we will do what our strategic requirements call for without reference to the unratified agreement. That's where I think I come out. Ken seems to think he could phrase it in a way which would be less upsetting generally and simply terminate or banish the agreement. So far I have some difficulty in seeing how that can be done but he may come up with something.


William J. Casey~~SECRET~~DCI
EXEC
REG

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L-225-IR